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ABSTRACT
We construct a long daily panel of short sales using proprietary NYSE order data.
From 2000 to 2004, shorting accounts for more than 12.9% of NYSE volume, sug-
gesting that shorting constraints are not widespread. As a group, these short sellers
are well informed. Heavily shorted stocks underperform lightly shorted stocks by a
risk-adjusted average of 1.16% over the following 20 trading days (15.6% annualized).
Institutional nonprogram short sales are the most informative; stocks heavily shorted
by institutions underperform by 1.43% the next month (19.6% annualized). The re-
sults indicate that, on average, short sellers are important contributors to efficient
stock prices.
THROUGHOUT THE FINANCIAL ECONOMICS LITERATURE, short sellers occupy an exalted
place in the pantheon of investors as rational, informed market participants
who act to keep prices in line. Theoreticians often generate a divergence be-
tween prices and fundamentals by building models that prohibit or constrain
short sellers (e.g., Miller (1977), Harrison and Kreps (1978), Duffie, Garleanu,
andPedersen(2002),Hong,Scheinkman,andXiong(2006)).Empiricalevidence
uniformly indicates that when short sale constraints are relaxed, overvalua-
tions become less severe, suggesting that short sellers move prices toward fun-
damentals(examplesincludeLamontandThaler(2003),DanielsenandSorescu
(2001),JonesandLamont(2002),Cohen,Diether,andMalloy(2007)).Butthere
issurprisinglylittledirectevidencethatshortsellersknowwhattheyaredoing.
There is indirect evidence in the existing literature. For example, Aitken
et al. (1998) show that in Australia, where some short sales were immediately
disclosed to the public, the reporting of a short sale causes prices to decline
immediately. Some authors (but not all) find that short interest predicts fu-
ture returns.1 Dechow et al. (2001) find that short sellers generate positive
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1 For example, Brent, Morse, and Stice (1990) find that monthly short interest does not predict
either the cross-section or time-series behavior of returns, Asquith, Pathak, and Ritter (2005) find
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abnormal returns by targeting companies that are overpriced based on funda-
mental ratios such as price-to-earnings and market-to-book.
In this paper, we provide direct evidence on the informativeness of short
sales using a long panel of all executed short sale orders submitted electron-
ically to the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE). First, we show that there is
a surprisingly large amount of shorting activity across both large and small
NYSE stocks, which suggests that shorting constraints are not widespread.
More importantly, we explore the extent to which short sellers are able to iden-
tify overvalued stocks and profit by anticipating price declines in these stocks.
We also have data identifying the type of trader initiating the short. This al-
lows us to determine which types of traders, if any, possess private information
about equity values.
There are theoretical reasons to expect short sellers to be well informed.
Diamond and Verrechia (1987) point out that since short sellers do not have
use of the sale proceeds, market participants never short for liquidity reasons,
which would imply relatively few uninformed short sellers, all else equal.2 The
stereotypical short seller takes a position based on fundamental information
about a company’s valuation, either on an absolute basis or relative to other
firms. Hedge funds practicing statistical arbitrage (“stat-arb funds”) are known
to use recent order flow information to anticipate short-term price movements.
On the other hand, there can be uninformed shorting, as there is a strong
hedging motive that is unique to short sales. For example, convertible arbi-
trage hedge funds and options market-makers might short a stock as part of
their hedging strategy, with little thought to whether the stock itself is over- or
undervalued. Index arbitrageurs might long futures or some other basket in-
strument and short the underlying stocks. Market-makers might short shares
as a part of their regular buffering activity. Some of these shorts are based on
information or opinions about the firm’s share price level; some are not. Thus,
it seems important to distinguish between these different types of shorts.
Our data identify the type of customer initiating the short. These account
type indicators are not overly detailed, but they do distinguish between
individuals, institutions, and member firm proprietary trades, and we can tell
if a short sale was executed as part of a program trade. This allows us to explore
which of these groups, if any, possess private information about equity values.
In the world of shorting, it is not obvious that institutions are better in-
formed than individuals. It is popular to regard individual stock trading as less
informed and even irrational, and there is plenty of evidence to support this
view. But few individual traders sell short, and those who do are likely to be
more sophisticated and knowledgeable. It is also easy to imagine that at least
predictive power only in the smallest stocks, while authors such as Asquith and Meulbroek (1996)
and Desai et al. (2002) find more evidence of predictive power in the cross-section. Lamont and
Stein (2004) find that aggregate short interest is extrapolative, reacting to past price moves, but
has no predictive power for future market moves.
2 Brokerage firms and regulators require that the proceeds of a short sale plus an additional
margin amount (currently equal to 50% of the value of the position in the U.S.) must be kept on
deposit in order to minimize the broker’s potential losses in the event of default by the short seller.Which Shorts Are Informed? 493
some negative private information is endowed (which is perhaps more likely for
individuals) rather than acquired through costly research (which is the likely
avenue for institutions). As part of their regular job duties, certain individuals,
such as corporate insiders, suppliers, and the like, might simply know when
things are not going well at a given firm. Corporate insiders are forbidden from
shorting their own stocks, but others are less restricted. And even corporate
insiders might take short positions in companies that are close substitutes.
An airline executive with negative information about the whole industry could
easily profit from his information by shorting his competitors’ stocks. With our
data, we can compare the information possessed by different types of short
sellers. To the best of our knowledge, ours is the first paper to do so.
Most of the empirical data on short selling capture the price or quantity
of shorting. The clearest pecuniary cost is associated with the rebate rate,
which has been studied by D’Avolio (2002), Geczy, Musto, and Reed (2002),
Jones and Lamont (2002), Ofek and Richardson (2003), Ofek, Richardson,
and Whitelaw (2004), and Cohen et al. (2007), among others. Quantity data
are the other major type of empirical data, and these quantities are almost
always stock rather than flow data. The most common sources for quantities
in the United States are the monthly short interest reports of the major
exchanges. As mentioned earlier, the evidence is mixed on whether these in-
dividual stock short interest reports can be used by an investor to earn excess
returns.
Our data are also quantity measures, of the flow of shorting activity rather
than the stock of open short positions. This has a number of advantages. First
of all, our data are much finer than traditional monthly short interest data.
We have the ability to examine daily or even intraday data on short sales. If
many shorts maintain their positions for only a short period of time, daily flow
data may be an improvement over coarse monthly short interest data. Jones
(2004) provides evidence, albeit from the early 1930s, that short-lived shorts
could be prevalent. During that period, shorting and covering on the same
day—known at the time as “in-and-out shorting”—averaged about 5% of total
daily volume, and a much bigger (but unknown) fraction of overall shorting
activity.
A second advantage of order level data is that we can identify many of the
characteristics of executed orders, such as the account type and order size. The
account type partitions are:
Account Type
Designation Description
Individual Agency orders that originate from individuals.
Institution Agency orders that do not originate from individuals.
Proprietary Orders for which NYSE members are trading as principal. Excludes all trades
by the specialist for his own account.
Other Includes orders by market-makers from options and other markets.494 The Journal of Finance
We further partition institutional and proprietary short sales depending on
whether the order is part of a program trade. A program trade is defined
as simultaneous orders to trade 15 or more securities having an aggregate
total value of at least $1 million. There is some incentive for institutions to
batch their trades to qualify as a program trade, because program trades
are often eligible for commission discounts from brokers. The result is six
different account types: individual, institution (program and nonprogram),
member-firm proprietary (program and nonprogram), and other.
Account types are coded by the submitting broker-dealer based on a set of
regulations issued by the NYSE. While they are generally unaudited, these
classifications are important to the NYSE and to broker-dealers because they
are required for a number of compliance reasons. For example, NYSE Rule 80A
suspends certain types of index arbitrage program trading on volatile trading
days, and account type classifications are important for enforcing this ban. The
specialist and traders on the floor do not, however, observe this account type
indicator for an incoming system order. These market participants generally
observe only the type, size, and limit price (if applicable) of an order. It is
possible for the specialist to research a particular order in real-time and
obtain information about the submitting broker. However, this takes a number
of keystrokes and requires a certain amount of time, and given the pace of
trading on the exchange and our conversations with specialists, we conclude
that this additional information is seldom if ever observed before execution.
In contrast, during our sample period the specialist is always aware that
a particular system sell order is a short sale. For compliance with the uptick
rule, short sales must be marked, and during our sample period software at the
trading post flags every short sale order to help the specialist comply with the
uptick rule.3 Should the uptick rule become binding on an order to short sell,
the display book software enforces a limit price to comply with the uptick rule.
This means that the specialist might be one of the few market participants
with an ability to incorporate this information into trading strategies, though
a specialist’s market-making obligations would constrain his ability to exploit
this information fully.
To our knowledge, we are the first academic researchers to partition short
sales by account type. NYSE account types have been used in a handful of other
related papers. For example, Kaniel, Saar, and Titman (2007) use NYSE ac-
count types to investigate investor sentiment, and Boehmer and Kelley (2007)
useaccounttypestoinvestigatetherelationshipbetweentheinformationaleffi-
ciency of prices and the amount of institutional trade. Other authors who study
3 During our sample period, the uptick rule applied to all stocks listed on the NYSE and AMEX.
The rule applies to most short sales and requires them to execute at a price that is either (a) higher
than the last sale price (an uptick), or (b) the same as the last sale price, if the most recent price
change was positive (a zero-plus tick). Since May 2005 the uptick rule has been suspended for
approximately one-third of NYSE stocks as part of Regulation SHO. Short sale orders in these
NYSE pilot stocks must still be marked by the submitting broker, but these are masked by the
NYSE’s display book software, which means the specialist and floor are unable to observe which
sell orders are shorts.Which Shorts Are Informed? 495
shortingflowdataincludeChristophe,Ferri,andAngel(2004),Daske,Richard-
son, and Tuna (2005), and Diether, Lee, and Werner (2007), but all these panels
aremuchshorterthanoursanddonotdistinguishamongdifferenttradertypes.
We also observe other aspects of the short sale order, notably the order size.
Both Barclay and Warner (1993) and Chakravarty (2001) find that medium-
sized orders are the most informed, consistent with their so-called stealth-
trading hypothesis, whereby large informed investors attempt to hide by break-
ing up their large orders into medium-sized pieces. When we partition short
sales by order size, we find somewhat different results. Like other small orders,
smallshortsaleordersareonaverageuninformed,andmedium-sizedshortsale
ordersof500–5,000sharesaremoreinformed.Incontrasttothestealthtrading
findings, however, we find that the largest short sale orders (those of at least
5,000 shares) are the most informative about future price moves. Thus, it ap-
pears that informed short sellers use larger orders than other informed traders.
It is worth pointing out that there are two aspects of shorting flow we do
not observe in our data. First, we do not observe short covering in our data
set.4 We can see the additions to short interest, but not the subtractions, so
we are unable to use our data to impute the level of short interest between the
monthly publication dates. Also, we do not observe all of the short sales that
take place. We observe all short sale orders that are submitted electronically
or otherwise routed through the NYSE SuperDOT system. We do not observe
short sales that are manually executed on the NYSE trading floor by a floor
broker. Also, we do not observe short sales that take place away from the
NYSE. Short sales executed on regional exchanges, in the upstairs market, or
offshore are not included in this sample, nor are shorts created synthetically
using total return swaps or other derivatives. Nevertheless, we believe that
our sample captures a substantial fraction of shorting activity, and our aim in
this paper is to explore the informativeness of this order flow.
As stated above, we observe all short sale orders that are submitted to the
NYSE trading floor via electronic means. While we do not know exactly what
fraction of total shorting is executed this way, based on overall volume figures
we do know that system order data capture a substantial fraction of overall
trading activity. According to the NYSE online fact book at nysedata.com,
during 2002 shares executed via the NYSE SuperDOT system are 70.5% of
NYSE volume. If short sale orders are routed and executed similarly, our
sample would account for 70.5% of all short sales in 2002. Of course, we cannot
be sure that this is the case. Given the uptick rule, short sellers may prefer the
hands-on order management of a floor broker. Short sales may also be executed
inLondonorelsewhereoutsidetheUnitedStatestoavoiddomesticrestrictions.
The paper is structured as follows. Section I discusses the sample in more
detail, both in terms of overall shorting flow and the account type subdivisions.
4 While it would be valuable to know when short positions are reversed, this information is not
available to any U.S. market venue, because brokers are not required to disclose whether a buy
order is intended to cover a short. In fact, market venues only observe short sales in order to ensure
compliance with short-sale price restrictions.496 The Journal of Finance
Section II examines the information in aggregate shorting flow for the cross-
section of future stock returns. Section III partitions shorting flow by account
type and by order size to see which kinds of short sales are most informative
about the cross-section of future returns. Section IV conducts a number of ad-
ditional robustness tests. Section V discusses the care that must be taken in
interpreting the empirical results. Section VI concludes.
I. Sample and Summary Statistics
The sample consists of all NYSE system order data records related to short
sales from January 2000 to April 2004. We cross-match to CRSP and retain
only common stocks, which means we exclude securities such as warrants, pre-
ferred shares, American Depositary Receipts, closed-end funds, and REITs.5
This leaves us a daily average of 1,239 NYSE-listed common stocks. For each
trading day, we aggregate all short sales in each stock that are subject to the
uptickrule.Afewshortsalesareexemptfromtheuptickrule.Theseincluderel-
ative value trades between stocks and convertible securities, arbitrage trades
in the same security trading in New York vs. offshore markets, and short sales
initiated by broker-dealers at other market centers as a result of bona fide
market-making activity. These exempt short sales are marked separately in
the system order data, and their share volume amounts to only 1.5% of total
shorting volume in our sample. We exclude these orders because they are less
likely to reflect negative fundamental information about the stock.
We measure shorting flow three different ways. First, we simply count the
number of executed short sale orders in a given stock on a given day, regard-
less of size. Jones, Kaul, and Lipson (1994) find that the number of trades,
rather than total volume, is most closely associated with the magnitude of price
changes, and our use of the number of executed short sale orders is in the same
spirit. Our second measure is the total number of shares sold short in a given
stock on a given day. Our final measure is the fraction of volume executed on
the NYSE in a given stock on a given day that involves a system short seller.
Table I, Panels A and B provide summary statistics about overall shorting
flow measures, undifferentiated by account type. NYSE common stocks expe-
rience an average of 146 executed short sale orders in a given day, with a mean
of 99,747 shares sold short via system orders per stock per day. Note that a
small number of stocks account for most of the shorting, as the median stock
has 27,425 shares sold short daily and the 75th percentile of 95,417 shares per
day is still below the mean.
One striking result is that during our sample period shorting via system
ordersaverages12.86%ofoverallNYSEtradingvolume(equal-weightedacross
stocks). In fact, shorting via system orders becomes more prevalent as our
5 Some care is required in matching stocks. NYSE data, including both SOD and TAQ, use
the ticker symbol as the primary identifier. However, ticker symbols are often reused, and ticker
symbols in CRSP do not always match the ticker symbols in NYSE data, especially for firms with
multiple share classes. We use tickers and CUSIPs to ensure accurate matching.Which Shorts Are Informed? 497
Table I
Summary Statistics
The sample consists of all common stocks listed on the NYSE and extends from January 2000 to
April 2004. Shorting’s share of volume (sfrac) is shares sold short on a given day as a percentage
of NYSE trading volume in that stock on that day. All shorting is aggregated per stock per day.
Reported figures are time-series averages of cross-sectional statistics, except for the right half
of Panel B, which reports cross-sectional averages of stock-by-stock autocorrelations and cross-
autocorrelations. In Panel B, all reported correlations are different from zero at p = 0.05.
Panel A: Daily system shorting per stock
Number of executed Shorting share
short sale orders Shares sold short of volume
(orders)( shares)( sfrac)
Mean 146 99,747 12.86%
Cross-sectional SD 194 232,541 10.59%
25% 23 6,331 4.90%
50% 77 27,425 10.27%
75% 192 95,417 18.10%
Avg. number of stocks 1,239 1,239 1,239
Panel B: Correlations and autocorrelations between returns and system shorting measures
Contemporaneous correlations Daily autocorrelations and cross-autocorrelations
orderst sharest sfract rett-1 orderst-1 sharest-1 sfract-1
rett 0.07 0.06 0.11 rett 0.00 −0.02 −0.02 −0.02
orderst 0.80 0.30 orderst 0.09 0.54 0.40 0.34
sharest 0.20 sharest 0.07 0.38 0.41 0.29
sfract 0.08 0.31 0.28 0.42
Panel C: Short-selling measures for 25 size and book-to-market portfolios
Size
B/M Small 2 3 4 Big
Daily shares sold short
Low 16,722 33,722 55,648 115,378 341,726
2 16,201 28,523 49,568 114,064 341,813
3 12,065 23,143 55,611 111,969 293,845
4 10,413 23,455 56,070 121,150 265,750
High 14,779 39,875 94,559 171,220 336,642
Shorting’s share of trading volume
Low 11.6% 14.0% 15.1% 15.2% 12.7%
2 11.8% 14.3% 15.2% 15.0% 13.0%
3 11.4% 13.6% 15.1% 15.1% 13.6%
4 10.7% 13.4% 14.9% 15.1% 14.5%
High 10.5% 14.0% 15.1% 14.5% 13.3%498 The Journal of Finance
sample period progresses, accounting for more than 17.5% of NYSE trad-
ing volume during the first 4 months of 2004. Recall that these are lower
bounds on the incidence of shorting at the NYSE, since our sample does not
include specialist short sales or short sales that are handled by a floor bro-
ker. Nevertheless, this number is somewhat surprising, since aggregate short
interest in NYSE stocks during 2004 is only 2.0% of shares outstanding. The
short interest numbers suggest that shorting is relatively uncommon, while
the shorting flow numbers indicate that shorting is quite pervasive. The di-
chotomy between these two numbers also means that short positions are
on average shorter-lived than long positions. To see this, note first that if
shareholders are homogeneous (so there is no Jensen’s inequality effect), then
Di = 1/Ti, (1)
where Di is the length of time between opening and unwinding a position in
stocki,andTi istheturnover(sharestraded/sharesoutstanding)instocki.F or
example, if 1% of the shares trade each day, then it takes 100 days for the entire
stock of outstanding shares to turn over, and the average holding period is 100
days.Assumingconstantshortinterestandhomogeneity,thesamerelationship
holds for the subset of positions held by shorts,
Duration of short positions
= short interest in shares/shorting volume in shares, (2)
and similarly for longs:
Duration of long positions
= total long positions/non-shorting volume
= (shares outstanding + short interest)/non-short volume in shares.
(3)
In 2004, for example, based on aggregate data from the NYSE online fact book,
aggregate short interest averages 7.6 billion shares, while aggregate shorting
volume totals 51.2 billion shares for the year, which means that the average
short position lasts 7.6/51.2 = 0.15 years, or about 37 trading days. In contrast,
the average duration for a long position is 1.20 years. The dichotomy is similar
when we use our sample of short sales instead of all short sales. These dramatic
differences in duration suggest that short selling is dominated by short-term
trading strategies.
Panel B shows contemporaneous correlations, first-order autocorrelations,
and cross-autocorrelations of our various daily shorting measures along with
stock returns. Contemporaneous correlations are calculated cross-sectionally
each day, and time-series average correlations are reported. All three shorting
flow measures are positively correlated, with correlations ranging from 0.20 to
0.80. The number of executed short sale orders and the number of shares sold
short are the most strongly positively correlated (ρ = 0.80). These measures
are not standardized in any way, and so it is not surprising that they are less
stronglycorrelatedwithshorting’sshareoftotalvolume,whichisstandardized.Which Shorts Are Informed? 499
All the shorting measures are persistent, with average first-order daily auto-
correlations between 0.41 and 0.54.6 Finally, these simple correlations suggest
that price increases attract informed short sellers. While the magnitudes are
small, the cross-sectional correlation is positive between shorting activity in a
stock and that stock’s return on the same or previous day, while the correlation
with the next day’s return is negative (and these correlations are statistically
different from zero).
Panel C of Table I sorts stocks into 25 size and book-to-market portfolios
and measures average shorting activity within each portfolio. Most notable is
shorting’s share of overall trading volume, at the bottom of the panel. There
are no strong patterns either across or down the panel, as the mean shorting
share varies only modestly from 10.5% to 15.2% of overall NYSE trading vol-
ume. Consistent with short interest data, there is a bit less shorting of small
firms, but even there shorting is quite prevalent. While there may still be costs
or impediments to short selling, these numbers suggest that many market par-
ticipants are overcoming these hurdles, even in the smallest NYSE stocks. It
could be that these are inframarginal short sales, and the constraints continue
to bind for some market participants. But the pervasiveness of shorting sug-
gests that shorting constraints are not very severe, at least for stocks in the
NYSE universe.
II. The Cross-section of Shorting and Future Returns
A. Simple Sorts
If short sellers are informed, the stocks they short heavily should underper-
form the stocks they avoid shorting. A portfolio approach is a natural way to
measure these cross-sectional differences (see also Pan and Poteshman (2006))
and has several advantages. First, it is easy to interpret, because it replicates
the gross and/or risk-adjusted returns to a potential trading strategy, assuming
(counterfactually) that one could observe all these shorting flow data in real
time. Second, compared to a regression approach, the aggregation into port-
folios can reduce the impact of outliers. Finally, portfolios are able to capture
certain nonlinearities that might characterize the relationship between short-
ing activity and future returns.
Thus, in the time-honored asset pricing tradition, we begin by sorting stocks
into portfolios based on our shorting flow measures. Each day, we sort into
quintiles based on shorting activity during the previous five trading days. The
four middle columns of Table II, Panel A show how these sorts are correlated
with other stock characteristics that have been studied previously. Shorting
activityispositivelycorrelatedwithtradingvolume,nomatterhowtheshorting
is measured. Shorting does not seem to be strongly correlated with daily stock
return volatility, however. The unstandardized shorting measures (number of
6 Autocorrelations and cross-autocorrelations are calculated stock by stock, and the table reports
cross-sectional average autocorrelations and cross-autocorrelations.500 The Journal of Finance
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tradesandsharessoldshort)arestronglypositivelycorrelatedwithsize.Thisis
unsurprising, because large cap stocks simply have more shares outstanding,
and one would expect more trading and thus more shorting of these stocks.
The standardized shorting measure (shorting’s share of volume) has a more
modest but opposite correlation to market cap. On average, large stocks tend to
experiencelightshortingbythesemeasures.Thereisnotmuchofarelationship
between the shorting flow measures and book-to-market ratios. As might be
expected, a bit more shorting activity is found in stocks that have high market
values relative to book. For example, the quintile with the smallest number of
shares shorted has an average book-to-market ratio of 0.77, while the heavily
shorted quintile has a book-to-market ratio of 0.60. Average book-to-market
differencesareevensmallerforshorting’sshareofoveralltradingvolume.Thus,
there is at best only weak evidence that short sellers target stocks with high
market-to-book as potentially overpriced. As one might expect, uncovering a
mispriced stock involves more than just studying book vs. market values.
Throughoutthepaper,wefollowthesamegeneralapproachregardlessofhow
stocksarepartitioned.Afterfirmsaresortedintoquintileseachday,weskipone
day (to eliminate any possibility that prices for firms in a particular quintile are
disproportionately at either the bid or the ask) and then hold a value-weighted
portfolio for 20 trading days. This process is repeated each trading day, so there
are overlapping 20-day holding period returns. To deal with this overlap, we
use a calendar-time approach to calculate average daily returns and conduct
inference(see,amongmanyexamples,JegadeeshandTitman(1993),whoapply
this method to returns on momentum portfolios). Each trading day’s portfolio
return is the simple average of 20 different daily portfolio returns, and 1/20
of the portfolio is rebalanced each day. To be precise, the daily return Rpt on
portfolio p is given by
Rpt =
1
20
20  
k=1
Q
ip
t−k−5,t−k−1w
ip
t−1Rit, (4)
where Q
ip
t−k−5,t−k−1 isanindicatorvariablesettooneifandonlyiftheith security
is assigned to portfolio p based on short-selling activity during the time interval
[t−k−5, t−k−1]; w
ip
t−1 are market-value weights at time t−1 (actually from the
previous calendar month-end in this case) normalized such that
 
i
Q
ip
t−k−5,t−k−1w
ip
t−1 = 1 (5)
for each portfolio p, date t, and portfolio formation lag k; and Rit is the return
on security i on date t.
Average daily calendar-time returns are reported in percent multiplied by
20 (to correspond to the holding period and also so that the returns cover ap-
proximately one calendar month), with t-statistics based on an i.i.d. daily time
series. The Fama and French (1993) alpha on portfolio p is the intercept (scaled502 The Journal of Finance
up by 20) in the following daily time-series regression:
Rpt − Rft = αp + βp1RMRFt + βp2SMBt + βp3HMLt + εpt. (6)
The four right-most columns of Table II show these raw returns and alphas for
each of the shorting quintile portfolios. The basic result is that short sellers
are well informed over this horizon.7 Most notable is the next month’s value-
weighted return on heavily shorted stocks (quintile 5) vs. the return on lightly
shorted stocks (quintile 1). The raw returns on heavily shorted stocks are ac-
tually negative, averaging –0.24% per month for those stocks with the most
executed short sale orders. In contrast, the corresponding portfolio of lightly
shorted stocks experiences an average return of 2.55% over the next 20 trading
days. These numbers suggest that short sellers are good at relative valuation,
and are particularly good at avoiding shorting undervalued stocks. However,
short sellers are not necessarily identifying stocks that are overvalued, since
the alphas on the heavily shorted stocks are approximately zero. This suggests
that perhaps it is better to think of short sellers as keeping prices in line rather
than bringing prices back into line.
Looking at the return differences, heavily shorted stocks underperform
lightly shorted stocks, no matter what shorting measure is used. We focus on
shorting’s share of overall trading volume because this measure is the most
orthogonal to size, book-to-market, and trading activity, each of which has been
shown to be related to average returns. Even though we are sorting on a mea-
sure that is mostly orthogonal to size and book-to-market characteristics, these
portfolios could still have different exposures to priced risks. On a risk-adjusted
basis, the heavily shorted stocks underperform lightly shorted stocks by an av-
erage of 1.16% per (20-day) month, or 15.64% annualized. Even though the
sample is only 4 1/3 years long, the average return difference is highly statisti-
cally significant, with a t-statistic of 3.67.
B. Double Sorts
Researchers have identified several characteristics that are associated with
cross-sectional differences in average returns. To confirm that shorting ac-
tivity is not simply isomorphic to these previously documented regularities,
we conduct double sorts based on some of these other characteristics known
to be associated with returns. Note that some of these other characteristics
are not available at high frequencies, so we first sort stocks into quintiles
based on size, market-to-book, stock return volatility, or turnover for the pre-
vious month. Within a characteristic quintile, we then sort a second time
into quintiles each day based on shorting flow over the past 5 trading days.
7 Shorting flow also contains information about future returns at other horizons, both shorter
and longer than 20 trading days. In fact, it appears to take up to 60 trading days for all of the
information contained in shorting flow to be fully incorporated into prices. This is discussed further
in Section III.A.Which Shorts Are Informed? 503
The result is a set of stocks that differ in shorting activity but have similar size,
market-to-book, volatility, or turnover.
Again we skip a day, and value-weighted portfolio returns are calculated
using a 20-day holding period. We then roll forward one day and repeat the
portfolioformationandreturncalculationprocess.Asbefore,weuseacalendar-
time approach to calculate returns and conduct inference, and Table III reports
the daily value-weighted risk-adjusted return difference (multiplied by 20) be-
tween the heavily shorted and lightly shorted quintiles. Return differences are
reported for each of the shorting activity measures.
Table III, Panel A controls for the firm’s market capitalization. The short-
ing effect is present across all five size quintiles. The results are strongest
for the smallest quintile, where heavily shorted stocks underperform lightly
shorted stocks by 2.20% to 3.33% per month. The shorts’ information advan-
tage in small stocks makes sense given the relative paucity of research cov-
erage and other readily available sources of information about these firms.
Based on the evidence in Table I, Panel C, even small stocks experience sig-
nificant shorting activity, so it is certainly possible for some investors to short
these stocks. However, small stocks may be expensive to short (see, for ex-
ample, the evidence in Geczy et al. (2002)), and it is important to remember
that the return differences throughout this paper do not account for any po-
tential costs of shorting. In contrast to Diether et al. (2007), who use a much
shorter sample period, the shorting effect is also fairly strong for the large-cap
quintile, with excess returns between 0.74% and 1.16% per month, depending
on the shorting measure. This is striking because many so-called anomalies
in finance do not appear in large-cap stocks, but the evidence here indicates
that short sellers as a group are earning substantial excess returns even on
bellwether stocks. We also perform a closely related double sort, first on insti-
tutional ownership (based on SEC 13f filings) and then on shorting flow. We do
not report these results in detail, but, in contrast to the short-interest evidence
in Asquith, Pathak, and Ritter (2005), heavily shorted stocks underperform
lightlyshortedstocksacrossallinstitutionalownershipquintiles.Thisprovides
additional evidence that shorts are informed across a wide spectrum of NYSE
firms.
In Panel B of Table III, we sort first by book-to-market and then by short-
ing activity. Our prior here was that low book-to-market might be a necessary
but not sufficient condition for a stock to be overvalued. If true, then short
sellers might further evaluate these stocks, identify those low book-to-market
stocks that are indeed overvalued, and short them heavily. If the short sellers
are correct, these heavily shorted stocks will eventually experience negative
returns.
This is partially borne out in the data. For stocks in the lowest book-to-
market quintile, shorting activity does have strong predictive power for the
cross-section of returns in the following month. Stocks with the most short sale
transactions underperform those with the fewest orders by 1.52% per month.
Sorting by the number of shares shorted gives a return difference of 1.30%504 The Journal of Finance
Table III
Return Differences on Short Sale Portfolios after Controlling
for Characteristics
The sample consists of all common stocks listed on the NYSE and extends from January 2000 to
April 2004. Firms are first sorted into quintiles based on the given characteristic. Within each
quintile, firms are then sorted into quintiles based on the short-selling measure for the past
5 days. Daily value-weighted returns are calculated using a calendar-time approach with a holding
period of 20 trading days. Daily Fama and French (1993) three factor alphas are given in percent,
multiplied by 20, for the return on the quintile with heavy short selling less the return on the
quintile with light short selling. In Panel E, the order imbalance is calculated using Lee and Ready
(1991) and is the share of volume initiated by buyers less the share volume initiated by sellers,
normalized by total volume. This variable is calculated over the same 5-day interval as the shorting
measure.
Panel A: First sort is market capitalization Panel B: First sort is book/market
Low 2 3 4 High Low 2 3 4 High
Second sort: number of executed short sale orders
pf5–pf1 −3.24 −1.60 −0.81 −1.09 −0.76 −1.52 −1.13 −1.67 −1.56 −3.08
t-stat −7.47 −3.92 −1.70 −2.69 −2.27 −3.57 −2.60 −3.49 −3.52 −5.87
Second sort: shares sold short
pf5–pf1 −2.20 −1.64 −0.64 −1.20 −0.74 −1.30 −1.09 −1.58 −1.48 −2.44
t-stat −4.36 −3.61 −1.17 −2.45 −1.97 −3.13 −2.56 −3.26 −3.35 −4.20
Second sort: shorting’s share of trading volume
pf5–pf1 −3.33 −1.80 −1.60 −1.19 −1.16 −1.23 −1.33 −1.14 −1.04 −1.07
t-stat −9.91 −5.67 −4.95 −4.46 −2.93 −2.43 −2.65 −2.55 −2.23 −1.74
Panel C: First sort is return volatility Panel D: First sort is share turnover
Low 2 3 4 High Low 2 3 4 High
Second sort: number of executed short sale orders
pf5–pf1 −1.10 −1.77 −1.62 −2.27 −4.55 −2.62 −2.19 −1.48 −2.30 −1.81
t-stat −2.58 −4.13 −3.50 −4.53 −5.82 −5.76 −5.93 −3.49 −4.44 −2.85
Second sort: shares sold short
pf5–pf1 −1.29 −1.71 −1.62 −2.07 −4.13 −2.38 −1.85 −1.37 −2.04 −1.72
t-stat −2.99 −4.03 −3.52 −4.04 −5.02 −5.35 −4.98 −3.23 −3.75 −2.54
Second sort: shorting’s share of trading volume
pf5–pf1 −0.77 −0.90 −1.09 −1.64 −1.87 −0.99 −1.43 −0.86 −1.10 −1.38
t-stat −2.04 −2.03 −2.11 −2.60 −2.48 −2.13 −3.55 −1.81 −1.73 −2.10
Panel E: First sort is past 5-day order imbalance
Low 2 3 4 High
Second sort: number of executed short sale orders
pf5–pf1 −1.84 −1.59 −1.55 −1.62 −1.98
t-stat −5.09 −4.84 −5.50 −5.12 −5.51
Second sort: shares sold short
pf5–pf1 −1.39 −1.33 −1.44 −1.64 −1.98
t-stat −3.84 −4.01 −5.00 −5.25 −5.47
Second sort: shorting’s share of trading volume
pf5–pf1 −1.89 −1.04 −0.82 −0.54 −0.26
t-stat −4.94 −2.87 −2.56 −1.63 −0.72Which Shorts Are Informed? 505
per month, and sorting by shorting’s share of volume gives a return difference
of 1.23%. All of these figures are economically large and statistically different
from zero.
In contrast to our priors, shorting activity seems to predict next month’s
returns across all book-to-market quintiles, and in fact may be slightly stronger
in the highest book-to-market quintile, where the return difference is as high
as 3.08% per month. For our preferred measure—shorting’s share of overall
volume—the excess return differences are quite similar across all five book-to-
market quintiles, ranging from 1.04% to 1.33% per month. We conclude from
this that low book-to-market is neither a necessary nor sufficient condition
for a stock to be overvalued. It appears that short sellers are able to identify
and short overvalued stocks across the book-to-market spectrum, with stocks
underperforming in the month after heavy shorting.
In Table III Panel C we control for individual stock return volatility. Ang
et al. (2006) find that firms with volatile stock returns severely underperform
on a risk-adjusted basis. One might guess that the volatility effect might be
related to our short-selling effect, if the volatility reflects severe differences
of opinion and thus heavy (and ex post informed) short selling. However, the
data indicate that the volatility effect does not chase out the return differences
based on shorting activity.8 For both low volatility and high volatility firms,
heavy shorting is an indicator of negative returns to come in the following
month. Still, the biggest effects are in the most volatile stocks, with return
differences between 1.87% and 4.55% per month. In these most volatile stocks,
short sellers seem to be particularly well informed.
In Table III, Panel D we examine the predictive power of shorting activity
controlling for trading volume. Brennan, Chordia, and Subrahmanyam (1998)
and Lee and Swaminathan (2000) find that high-volume firms underperform
low-volume firms, which makes it important to rule out the possibility that
our shorting activity measures are simply reflecting overall trading activity.
Indeed, shorting flow strongly explains the cross-section of future returns re-
gardless of the amount of overall turnover. Using shorting’s share of trading
volume as the second sort variable, return differences average 0.86% to 1.43%
per month across trading volume quintiles. This establishes that the shorting
effect in this paper is independent of the earlier volume regularity. Again, it is
interesting to note that these excess returns are also being earned in the most
active stocks. In the most active quintile, the heavy shorting quintile underper-
forms the light shorting quintile by as much as 1.81% per month. As discussed
in the double sorts with size, these results are striking, because anomalies in
finance tend to be found in less active, illiquid stocks. But it is important to re-
member that these return differences are not tradable and are simply returns
to private information, and there is no requirement that there be less private
information about active stocks.
8 In results not reported, we also confirm that our shorting flow measures do not chase out
the underperformance of very volatile stocks. In addition, even the most volatile stocks are being
shorted on a regular basis, which suggests that short sale constraints cannot easily account for
Ang et al.’s return findings.506 The Journal of Finance
C. Short Sales vs. Other Sales
Doshortsellerstradeonbetterordifferentinformationfromregularsellers?9
As noted earlier, Diamond and Verrechia (1987) observe that since short-sale
proceeds cannot be used for consumption, short sales are never undertaken for
liquidity reasons, which means short sales should be more informed than other
sales, all else equal. Short sellers may also receive different types of signals
about fundamentals, in which case their trades would differ considerably from
those of other informed sellers.
To investigate the differences between the two types of sellers, we compare
our shorting activity measures to signed order imbalances measured over the
same time interval. We use order imbalances (OIB) because they are also flow
measures, and a recent line of research such as Chordia and Subrahmanyam
(2004) argues that order imbalances may be good proxies for the direction and
intensity of informed trading.
OIBs are calculated by identifying the side that initiates each trade using the
Lee and Ready (1991) algorithm. Trades that take place above the prevailing
quote midpoint (or at the midpoint but at a higher price than the previous
trade)areassumedtobeinitiatedbybuyers,andtheOIBiscalculatedasbuyer-
initiated volume less seller-initiated volume.10 Using TAQ data, we calculate
order imbalances for each stock over the same 5-day horizon used to calculate
the shorting activity measure, and normalize by the total trading volume in the
stock over the same period. We sort stocks first into quintiles based on OIB, and
then within each quintile we sort stocks into quintiles based on short selling
activity.
The results are in Table III, Panel E. Order imbalances have little effect on
the predictive power of shorting flow. When short sale flow is measured by the
number of orders or number of shares, return differences range from 1.33%
to 1.98% per month across the various OIB quintiles. When short sale flow is
measured relative to overall volume, there is some evidence that short sales
are not very informed when OIB is most positive. However, even when OIB is
most negative, short sale activity still seems to be quite informed, with heavily
shorted stocks underperforming lightly shorted stocks by an average of 1.89%
over the following month. Thus, it appears that the information possessed by
short sellers is largely orthogonal to the information that lies behind seller-
initiated trades.
D. Regression Results
The disadvantage of double sorts is that it is only possible to control for
one other characteristic at a time. To control simultaneously for multiple
9 We thank the referee for suggesting this investigation.
10 Note that short sales and OIB are not inherently correlated. Like all transactions, short sales
are included in the calculation of OIB. But due to the uptick rule, short sales are less likely to
take place below the prevailing quote midpoint than other sales, and are therefore less likely to be
classified as seller-initiated for OIB purposes.Which Shorts Are Informed? 507
characteristics, we adopt a regression approach based on Fama and MacBeth
(1973). Each day, we run cross-sectional predictive regressions including the
shorting activity measure as well as firm and/or stock characteristics. There
is one cross-sectional regression per day, and the shorting activity variable is
again calculated by averaging shorting over the previous five days. The de-
pendent variable is the raw or risk-adjusted return over the next 20 trading
days, again skipping 1 day after measuring shorting activity. Risk-adjusted
returns are calculated using the Fama and French (1993) three-factor model
using the previous calendar quarter of daily data to estimate factor loadings
for each stock. We use a Fama-MacBeth approach to conduct inference, with
Newey-West standard errors (using 20 lags) to account for the resulting over-
lap. Rather than continue to report similar results for the three different short-
ing activity measures, from now on we use shorting’s share of trading volume,
which as discussed earlier is the most orthogonal of our shorting measures to
size, book-to-market, and trading activity variables that have been previously
studied. In addition, each day we standardize the cross-sectional distribution
of our explanatory variables to have zero mean and unit standard deviation.
Shorting becomes somewhat more prevalent as our sample period progresses,
so this normalization is designed to mitigate the effects of any trend that might
otherwise affect inference in the Fama-MacBeth framework.
TheresultsareinTableIV.Theeffectoftheshortingflowmeasureisvirtually
the same using raw or risk-adjusted returns, so only the Fama and French
(1993) alphas are discussed. We begin with a benchmark simple regression
of future returns on shorting activity. In the cross-section, a unit standard
deviation increase in shorting activity results in risk-adjusted returns over the
next 20 days that are 0.53% lower, on average. The confidence interval on this
estimate is quite small, with a t-statistic greater than 10. The shorting results
are virtually unchanged when we include standardized characteristic controls,
including size, book-to-market, and turnover, as well as volatility and returns
over the previous month.
Thethirdspecificationinthetablealsoincludesorderimbalancesasexplana-
tory variables. As discussed in the previous section, the idea is to investigate
whether short selling is any different from other selling in terms of ability to
predict the future cross-section of returns. Here we allow buy imbalances and
sell imbalances to have different effects based on results in the order imbal-
anceliterature.Specifically,wecalculateOIBasthefractionofvolumeinitiated
by buyers less the fraction of volume initiated by sellers and standardize the
variable to have unit cross-sectional standard deviation each day. The positive
imbalance variable is defined as max(0, OIB), while the negative imbalance
variable is defined as min(0, OIB).
What is the right null for this regression? If markets are efficient with re-
spect to all publicly available information, the coefficients on OIB and shorting
flow should in fact be different. Because order imbalances are identified us-
ing publicly available trade and quote data, OIB can be observed essentially
in real time. As a result, prices should be efficient with respect to OIBs, and
OIBs should not predict future returns. In contrast, short sales are not publicly508 The Journal of Finance
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observed, so short sale flow can be related to future returns as long as it is not
collinear with OIB.
The regression results in Table IV indicate that negative order imbalances
are informative about the future cross-section of returns, but in the opposite
direction to our short sale flow data. The negative sign on negative OIB in-
dicates a reversal over the next 20 days, consistent with the inventory-effect
interpretation in Chordia and Subrahmanyam (2004). That is, following heavy
seller-initiated trading, prices tend to rebound. Specifically, when negative or-
der imbalances get larger (more negative) by one standard deviation, returns
are a statistically significant 0.53% higher in the next month. In contrast, in
the 20 days following heavy short selling, prices fall, and the coefficient on
shorting flow is virtually unchanged by the inclusion of the order imbalance
variables. This indicates that the information in short sales is quite distinct
from the information that gives rise to sell order imbalances.
III. Trading by Different Account Types
We now turn to the question asked in the title of the paper. As discussed ear-
lier, system short sales on the NYSE are partitioned into six different account
types: individual, institutional (program and nonprogram), member-firm pro-
prietary (program and nonprogram), and other. What might we expect going
into the exercise? As noted in the introduction, it is not obvious that individual
shorts would be less informed than institutional or member-firm proprietary
shorts.Itisalsohardtoknowwhattoexpectforprogramvs.nonprogramtrades.
As mentioned earlier, program trades are defined as simultaneous trades in 15
or more stocks worth at least $1 million. One well-known type of program trade
is index arbitrage, which involves trading baskets of stocks when they become
slightly cheap or dear relative to index derivatives such as futures. Index arbi-
trage short positions seem unlikely to contain any information about the cross-
section. However, hedge funds and other institutions often use program trades
to quickly and cheaply trade a large number of names, since the commission
rate is often lower for computerized program trades. Such program trades often
mix buys and sells together. Clearly, in such cases the hedge funds believe they
have private information about the cross-section that is not yet incorporated
into price. Our priors about proprietary trades are also fairly diffuse. If these
proprietary trading desks are mostly acting as market-makers, they are likely
to be uninformed over the longer term about fundamentals.11 However, propri-
etary trading desks often trade like hedge funds, and one might expect those
shorts to be more informed.
Table V, Panel A helps to provide some sense of the distribution of shorting
acrossaccounttypes.ShortingbyindividualsontheNYSEisfairlyrare,asthey
11 Member-firm proprietary desks can supply liquidity without competing directly with the spe-
cialist. For example, a block desk may purchase a large block of stock from a customer early in
the day (in the upstairs market) and then proceed to gradually trade out of the position on the
exchange floor.510 The Journal of Finance
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tend to account for 1% to 2% of overall shorting volume. This is not peculiar to
shorting; overall NYSE order flow exhibits similar patterns (see, for example,
Jones and Lipson (2004)). Part of the explanation is that individuals account
for only a small amount of overall trading volume. But part of this paucity of
individual orders is due to the brokerage routing decision. Many, if not most,
brokerage firms either internalize retail orders in active stocks or route these
orders to regional exchanges or third-market dealers in return for payment. As
a result, very few orders from individuals make their way to the NYSE. Insti-
tutions submit most short sale orders, and account for about 74% of the total
shares shorted via system orders. Member-firm proprietary shorts represent
about 20% of total shorting. Somewhat surprisingly, if we slice firms by market
cap, volatility, or prior return, there is not much variation in these fractions of
overall shorting volume.
A. Simple Sorts
To investigate the information in short sales by different account types, we
begin again with a sorting approach. Each day, stocks are sorted into quintiles
based on shorting’s share of trading volume by the specified account type over
the previous 5 days. Returns are calculated for each of these 5 value-weighted
portfolios, and the focus continues to be on the daily return difference between
the heavy shorting quintile and the light shorting quintile. Calendar-time dif-
ferences in Fama and French (1993) alphas are calculated for holding periods
from 10 to 60 trading days. Reported alphas are daily values in percent and are
multiplied by 20 to approximate a monthly excess return.
The results are detailed in Table V, beginning in Panel B. For comparison to
earlier results, we focus first on 20-day holding periods. Recall for comparison
that using aggregate shorting by all account types, the heavy shorting quintile
underperformsthelightshortingquintilebyacumulative1.16%over20trading
days, and this underperformance is strongly statistically distinct from zero,
with a t-statistic of 3.67.
Nextwelookatshortsalesinitiatedbyvariousaccounttypes,withtheresults
also reported in Table V, Panel B. Institutions and member-firm proprietary
short sales that are not part of a program trade are the most informed. Over a
20-day holding period, stocks with heavy shorting by institutions underperform
the light shorting quintile by a significant 1.43%, which is 19.6% annualized.
The corresponding figure for member-firm proprietary nonprogram shorts is
1.34% or 18.3% annualized, and both return differences are statistically quite
different from zero. The nonprogram institutional and proprietary alphas are
not statistically distinguishable from each other, but they are reliably more in-
formed than all other account types. In fact, we cannot reject the hypothesis
that short sales by other account types (individual, institutional and propri-
etary program trades, and other accounts) are completely uninformed, as none
of the alphas are statistically different from zero. For example, the quintile of
stocks most heavily shorted by individuals underperforms the light shorting
quintile by only 0.14% over the next month.Which Shorts Are Informed? 513
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Figure 1. Risk-adjusted return differences on short-sale portfolios of different account
types. The sample consists of all common stocks listed on the NYSE and extends from January
2000 to April 2004. Firms are sorted into quintiles based on short selling (shares sold short by the
specified account type as a percentage of NYSE trading volume) over the past 5 days. We show
average Fama and French (1993) alphas for holding periods up to 60 trading days. Alphas are for
the heaviest shorting quintile less the lightest shorting quintile and are expressed in percent.
One might worry that these negative relative returns are only temporary,
with reversals at longer horizons. Among other things, such reversals could
indicate manipulation by short sellers or overreaction by other market partici-
pants to the presence of short sales. To investigate, we look at holding periods
of 10, 20, 40, and 60 trading days. We continue to skip one day between mea-
suring short sales and calculating holding period returns. Daily alphas are
computed using a calendar-time approach but are reported scaled up by 20
(to reflect a monthly return) regardless of the actual holding period. We fo-
cus on institutional and proprietary nonprogram shorts, which are the only
short sellers that are reliably informed. Table V, Panel B shows that heavily
shorted stocks experience the biggest underperformance in the first 10 days.
Using institutional nonprogram shorts as an example, the 10-day relative al-
pha is −1.13%, and on average repeating the strategy over the next 10 days
yields a 20-day relative alpha of −2.27% (the number in the table). This is
larger in magnitude than the 20-day holding period alpha of –1.43%. While the
alphas are closer to zero with longer holding periods, it is still the case that
heavily shorted stocks continue to underperform for at least 60 days. Figure
1 shows the daily evolution of these excess returns up to 60 days. Here the
alphas are not monthly but instead correspond to the holding period. Cumula-
tive excess returns tend to flatten slightly at the longer horizons, suggesting
that more of the information possessed by short sellers is impounded into price
in the first few trading days, but some information possessed by short sellers
is impounded into price over longer horizons, with short sale flow remaining
informative even 3 months later. Thus, while much of the information in short
sales seems to be shorter-lived than one month, some of the information takes514 The Journal of Finance
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Figure 2. Return differences on short-sale portfolios. The sample consists of all common
stocks listed on the NYSE and extends from January 2000 to April 2004. Firms are first sorted
into quintiles based on shorting activity over the past 5 trading days (shares sold short as a per-
centage of NYSE trading volume). The figure reports average value-weighted return differences
(quintile 5–quintile 1), calculated as the calendar-time daily return difference cumulated over each
calendar month and expressed in percent. Institutional and proprietary shorting measures exclude
executions that are part of a program trade.
up to 60 trading days to find its way into prices, and there is no evidence of
reversals.
Much of the 2000–2004 sample period is characterized by a substantial and
extended market decline. One might wonder if the predictive power of shorting
flow is most valuable in a declining market. Figure 2 addresses this question,
andmoregenerallyshowstheprofitsandlossesovertimefromthishypothetical
“trading strategy.” Specifically, it shows the raw return differences between the
heavy shorting and light shorting quintiles for each month of the 20-day hold-
ing period calendar-time strategy, based on shorting relative to trading volume.
Considering all shorting activity, heavily shorted stocks underperform lightly
shorted stocks in about two-thirds of the months, and the results are fairly con-
sistent throughout the sample. For institutional short sellers, the worst month
is March 2002, when heavily shorted stocks actually outperform lightly shorted
stocksby2.20%.TheirbestmonthisJanuary2001,whenheavilyshortedstocks
underperform lightly shorted stocks by 9.30%. Overall, the low standard devi-
ation of 2.27% per month for relative returns means a great deal of statisti-
cal power against the null, even though the sample is only a bit more than
four years long. The results are similar when quintiles are assigned using all
shorting or nonprogram proprietary shorting activity. These graphs are similar
to those for many tradable regularities, with favorable return differentials in
many but by no means all months. We also check formally whether the results
are different across calendar years and find no evidence of nonstationarity.Which Shorts Are Informed? 515
Our sample period is also characterized by a number of high-profile frauds
and collapses, including Enron, Worldcom, and Adelphia, among others. World-
com and Adelphia are not in our sample because they were listed on Nasdaq.
But one might worry that the results are being driven by a small number of
extreme observations where short sellers made the bulk of their profits. This is
not the case; the results are not driven by a small number of outliers. When we
exclude firms in the far left tail of the holding period return distribution (the
worst 1% or 5%), the magnitudes of underperformance are naturally slightly
reduced, but the qualitative results are unchanged. The remaining 95% or 99%
of stocks continue to reliably underperform if they have been heavily shorted.
We also confirm that the results are not driven by the bursting of the so-
called “tech bubble,” with sharp declines in technology firm stock prices. Note
thatthesampleisalreadylimitedtoNYSEfirmsandexcludesthevastmajority
of technology stocks, which are listed on Nasdaq. We partition the sample into
tech vs. nontech firms using the SIC codes in Loughran and Ritter (2004) and
recalculate return differences based on shorting activity. There is no evidence
that the results are driven by technology stocks. For some shorting measures,
the return differences are larger for tech firms, and for other shorting mea-
sures, the return differences are smaller. More importantly, for nontech firms
the difference in Fama and French (1993) alphas between heavily shorted and
lightly shorted stocks is always significant and greater than 1% per month.
An important question is how the information possessed by these short sell-
ers gets into price. One possibility is that the market is looking carefully for
evidence of shorting in order to copy the trading behavior of short sellers. This
is consistent with the data in Aitken et al. (1998), where the disclosure of a
short sale on the tape in Australia leads to an immediate decline in price. The
corresponding disclosure in the U.S. is monthly short interest, so one might
guess that once short interest is published, prices react to surprise changes in
short interest. To determine whether this accounts for our return differences,
we identify the short interest release date each month during our sample and
exclude it from the portfolio holding period. The results are in Table V, Panel
C, and excluding the short interest release date makes virtually no difference
in the measured underperformance of heavily shorted stocks. Whatever the
nature of the information possessed by short sellers, the release of short in-
terest does not appear to be an important mechanism for incorporating that
information into prices.
B. Regression Results
We next look at shorting by account type in a regression framework. As in
SectionII,thisallowsustocontrolforvariousstockorfirmcharacteristicsallat
once. It also allows us to simultaneously compare short selling across account
types. Based on the simple sorts, nonprogram shorting by institutions con-
tains the most information about the cross-section of future stock returns. But
shorting by various account types is positively contemporaneously correlated,
so an important question is whether short sellers of various account types are516 The Journal of Finance
acting on similar information. Perhaps there is a common factor describing this
shorting behavior, in which case it is enough to look at institutional shorting
alone. Alternatively, perhaps other account types are shorting based on orthog-
onal sources of information about share price. For example, institutions may
be trading based on fundamental information, while member-firm proprietary
trading desks may be trading based on their knowledge of order flow in a stock.
These two signals may or may not be related.
Toinvestigatethispossibility,weruncross-sectionalpredictiveregressionsto
determine which account types’ shorting contributes incremental explanatory
power for future returns. There is one cross-sectional regression per day, and
like all other tests in the paper the regression uses 5 days’ worth of shorting
information. The dependent variable is the return over the next 20 trading
days. We use a Fama-MacBeth approach to conduct inference, with Newey-
West standard errors with 20 lags to account for the overlap in holding period
returns.Asbefore,eachexplanatoryvariableisstandardizedtohavezerocross-
sectional mean and a standard deviation of one each trading day.
The results are in Table VI. Here we find some evidence that program trades
are also informed. When we include one account type at a time, controlling
for other firm characteristics and order imbalances, more short selling by each
account type except individuals implies reliably lower returns over the next
20 days. Heavy shorting by individuals is the exception and does not seem to
be informative about future returns.
When all six account types are put into the regression at the same time, both
types of member-firm proprietary shorts become insignificant. Institutional
shorting, both program and nonprogram, are the only short sales with incre-
mental explanatory power for the cross-section of returns next month. This is
somewhat surprising, since proprietary and other account types show strong
univariate predictive power. The results suggest that shorting by these account
types is correlated with institutional shorting, but that institutional shorting
dominates in terms of information content. The magnitude of the coefficient
estimates confirms the superior informativeness of nonprogram institutional
shorting, as all else equal a one standard deviation cross-sectional increase
in nonprogram institutional shorting implies an average return over the next
month that is 0.39% lower.
Coefficients on the control variables generally have the same sign as in
Table IV, except that positive OIB now significantly lowers future returns in
most models. Negative OIB remains significantly negative, and order imbal-
ances in both directions are associated with subsequent return reversals. As
before, however, controlling for order imbalances leaves the predictive ability
of shorting intact. In fact, adding the two OIB variables to the model leaves
the estimated coefficients on shorting and their standard errors essentially
unchanged. This suggests that whatever influence order imbalances have on
subsequent returns, their effect is small and largely orthogonal to that of short-
ing. Finally, we have also run these regressions with various subsets of control
variables and the results are the same.Which Shorts Are Informed? 517
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C. Order Size
Because we can observe individual short sale orders in every NYSE stock,
it is possible to look at the informativeness of large short sales vs. small short
sales. Our prior is that small short sales would be uninformed, and the stealth
trading results of Barclay and Warner (1993) and Chakravarty (2001) suggest
that medium-sized shorts might be the most informative.
Short sale orders are partitioned into 5 order size categories: less than 500
shares, 500–1,999 shares, 2,000–4,999 shares, 5,000–9,999 shares, and orders
of at least 10,000 shares. By coincidence it turns out that the median short
sale order size is exactly 500 shares. Larger orders are less common: 31% of
short sale orders are between 500 and 1,999 shares, 10% are between 2,000
and 4,999 shares, 5% are between 5,000 and 9,999 shares, and only 4% are for
10,000 shares or more.
Table VII, Panel A reports some summary statistics on the mix of order sizes
across account types. The average institutional short sale order is 550 shares
if part of a program trade and 743 shares otherwise. There is an even bigger
differential for proprietary trades: The average size is 398 shares for shorts
that are part of a program trade, and 729 shares for nonprogram shorts. In-
terestingly, both individual and other account type shorts tend to be larger on
average. The average individual short is 820 shares, while the average short
from the “other” account type is 1,015 shares.
Some researchers partition by trade size and argue that large trades are
institutional, while small trades are retail. Table VII, Panel A shows that, at
least for short sale, this is an unwarranted generalization. Individuals account
for only 1% of the short sale orders less than 500 shares and account for at most
2%oftheshortsaleordersinotherordersizecategories.Thevastmajorityofall
shorting is nonretail, and this is true for all order sizes. Program trades account
for 45% of short sales less than 500 shares, but only 10% of short sale orders
for 10,000 shares or more. Finally, it is worth noting that the “other” account
type submits a disproportionate number of large short sale orders. While this
account type is responsible for only 7% to 9% of the orders under 5,000 shares,
it accounts for 31% of the 10,000+ share orders.
We use a double sort method to investigate large and small short sales sep-
arately. Each day, we first sort stocks into quintiles based on shorting activity
over the past 5 days, with shorting activity measured as shorting’s fraction of
overall trading volume in that stock. Within a quintile, we then sort a second
timeintoquintilesbasedonthefractionofthatstock’sshortsaleordersthatare
of a given size. The result is a set of stocks with similar overall shorting activity
but different shorting activity at a given order size. We repeat this exercise for
four order size categories. There are so few short sale orders of 10,000 shares or
more that the sorts do not work well, so we combine the two largest order size
categories into a single category covering short sales of at least 5,000 shares.
For each order size category, value-weighted returns and Fama and French
(1993)alphasarecalculatedfora20-dayholdingperiodusingthecalendar-time
approach and are reported in Panels B and C of Table VII. Return differencesWhich Shorts Are Informed? 519
Table VII
The Information in Short-Sale Orders of Various Sizes
The sample consists of all common stocks listed on the NYSE and extends from January 2000 to
April 2004. Panel A provides a breakdown by account type for short sale orders in a given size
range; each row sums to 100%. For Panels B and C, firms are first sorted into quintiles based on
shorting as a fraction of total volume over the past 5 days. Within each quintile, firms are then
sorted into quintiles based on the prevalence of a given order size among short orders in that stock
for the past 5 days. Daily value-weighted returns (Panel B) and three-factor alphas (Panel C) are
calculated using a calendar-time approach with a holding period of 20 trading days. Daily mean
returns and alphas are given in percent, multiplied by 20, for the return on the quintile with the
most short sale orders of the given size less the return on the quintile with the fewest short sale
orders of the given size.
Panel A: Shorting at various order sizes by account type
Fraction of all short sale orders in the given order size category
Institution Proprietary
Order size
(in shares) Individual Nonprog. Program Nonprog. Program Other
1–499 1% 32% 26% 15% 19% 8%
500–1,999 1% 51% 19% 10% 11% 7%
2,000–4,999 2% 53% 20% 10% 7% 9%
5,000–9,999 2% 52% 14% 11% 4% 17%
10,000+ 1% 45% 8% 13% 2% 31%
Average short sale order size (in shares)
820 743 550 729 398 1,015
Panel B: Raw returns Panel C: Fama–French alphas
(First sort is shorting’s (First sort is shorting’s
share of volume) share of volume)
Low 2 3 4 High Low 2 3 4 High
Second sort: fraction of short sale orders <500 shares
pf5–pf1 1.62 1.51 1.56 1.37 0.61 0.69 0.83 0.96 0.94 0.50
t-stat 2.44 2.62 3.21 3.01 1.41 1.22 1.60 2.22 2.27 1.20
Second sort: fraction of short sale orders [500, 2,000) shares
pf5–pf1 −0.74 0.17 −0.27 −0.34 −0.07 −0.40 0.14 −0.26 −0.52 −0.08
t-stat −1.75 0.37 −0.61 −0.80 −0.17 −0.97 0.32 −0.62 −1.26 −0.19
Second sort: fraction of short sale orders [2,000, 5,000) shares
pf5–pf1 −1.83 −1.21 −1.25 −1.12 −0.65 −0.93 −0.52 −0.81 −0.80 −0.62
t-stat −2.95 −2.65 −3.04 −2.96 −1.90 −1.79 −1.33 −2.16 −2.26 −1.86
Second sort: fraction of short sale orders ≥5,000 shares
pf5–pf1 −2.75 −2.14 −1.85 −1.50 −1.29 −1.34 −2.03 −1.59 −1.13 −1.38
t-stat −2.63 −3.88 −3.88 −3.38 −3.10 −1.53 −3.00 −2.61 −1.97 −2.23
are calculated as the return on the quintile with the most shorts in a given size
bucket minus the return on the quintile with the least prevalent shorts in a
given size bucket. This number is negative if stocks with heavy shorting of a
given order size underperform.
An example may help clarify the two sorts. Suppose we want to investigate
the informativeness of small short sales. First sort stocks based on shorting’s520 The Journal of Finance
share of trading volume over the past 5 days, and consider, for example, the
lowest quintile, which consists of lightly shorted stocks. For each stock in this
quintile, calculate the fraction of its short sale orders that are for less than
500 shares. Sort a second time into quintiles based on this small order fraction.
Now calculate value-weighted returns over the next 20 days for the subquintile
with the most small short sale orders vs. the subquintile with the fewest small
short sale orders and compute the difference. In our example, Table VII, Panel
C gives the Fama and French (1993) alpha on this return difference as 0.69%.
That is, among stocks with the least overall shorting activity, stocks with many
small short sale orders actually outperform stocks with few small short sale
orders by 0.69% over the next month, though this number is not statistically
distinguishable from zero.
Nevertheless,thisresultisquitestriking,becausesmallshortsalesareworse
than uninformed. In fact, they seem to appear at exactly the wrong times, and
one shouldn’t follow these small shorts at all. If one could identify and instead
buy the stocks for which shorting is dominated by small orders, these would
outperform stocks for which small short sales are less prevalent. In fact, this
result holds across this entire row of Panel C regardless of overall shorting
activity, with 20-day average returns between 0.50% and 0.96%.
In contrast, when large short sale orders dominate the mix, stocks tend to
underperform. The results are fairly weak for short sales between 2,000 and
5,000 shares. Stocks with heavy shorting in this size bucket underperform by
0.52% to 0.93% over the next 20 days, and the numbers are only sometimes sig-
nificantly different from zero. The numbers are strongest for the biggest short
sale orders. When orders to short at least 5,000 shares are most prevalent,
the stock underperforms by a risk-adjusted average of 1.13% to 2.03% in the
following month. While not all of these are distinguishable from zero, there is
a consistent monotonic relationship between short sale order size and infor-
mativeness, indicating that short sellers who choose to submit large orders on
average are better informed about future stock price moves.
Perhaps this is not surprising. The better a trader’s information, the more
she should want to trade. But this is not the usual result in the literature
on the informativeness of different order sizes. Earlier stealth trading results,
which are calculated using all buys and sells rather than just short sales, come
to different conclusions. The results on small short sales are similar: They
appear to be completely uninformed. The stealth trading results would suggest
that medium-sized shorts contain the most information. But we find that the
information in short sales is monotonic in order size. The larger the short sale,
the more informative it is about future price moves. In contrast to the stealth
trading results, the largest short sales of over 5,000 shares appear to have the
greatest ability to predict future price moves.
While we are not sure why this is so, one possibility is that these short sellers
possess short-term information and cannot afford to be patient in executing
their orders. Another possible explanation is that the uptick rule might inhibit
the kind of slicing and dicing that we see on many other institutional orders.
If the uptick rule reduces the probability of getting an order executed, perhapsWhich Shorts Are Informed? 521
short sellers cannot afford the execution uncertainty associated with splitting
orders and submit large orders instead. If this second explanation is true, we
might see this result change for those stocks that become exempt from the
uptickruleduringtheRegulationSHOpilotprogramcurrentlybeingconducted
by the SEC.
IV. Shorting Flow vs. Short Interest
Most of the existing literature on the informativeness of short sales uses
monthly short interest data, and there is some evidence that monthly short in-
terest can predict the future cross-section of returns. One might worry that our
shorting measures are highly collinear with monthly changes in short interest,
with little additional information provided by the higher frequency intermedi-
ate flows. Certainly our shorting flow measures are correlated with monthly
changesinshortinterest,becausetheyareacomponentofthatmonthlychange.
The monthly change in short interest is the sum of shares shorted in our sample
over the relevant days plus manual NYSE short sales plus off-NYSE short sales
less all covering transactions. The null hypothesis is that the monthly changes
in short interest are sufficient to capture the information possessed by short
sellers.
To investigate this possibility, we use a double sort method. The first sort is
based on monthly short interest changes for the previous month, in shares. The
second sort is based on one of the three shorting flow measures for the past 5
days. As before, the portfolio holding period is 20 days, and we calculate a new
set of portfolios and holding period returns for each trading day. The results
are in Table VIII, Panel A, and they show the difference in value-weighted
cumulative 20-day Fama and French (1993) alphas following heavy vs. light
shorting. Short interest does not drive out the shorting flow measures. For
instance, using shorting normalized by trading volume, heavily shorted stocks
underperform lightly shorted stocks by 0.96% to 1.60% per month across the
short interest quintiles, with all 5 values statistically different from zero.
In Table VIII, Panel B, we reverse the sorting order to see if our shorting
flow measure drives out the predictive value of short interest. First we sort on
our shorting flow measure, and then we sort on changes in short interest and
examine future returns on stocks with the largest increases in short interest
vs. the largest decreases. In 13 of 15 cases, the shorting flow measures drive
out short interest. That is, once we control for shorting flow, changes in short
interest are no longer significant predictors of the future cross-section of re-
turns. This indicates that our measures dominate short interest as a proxy for
the information in short sales.
V. Implementability and Frictions
Before the reader begins to raise money for a hedge fund trading on these
return differentials, it is important to emphasize again that these shorting flow
measures are not publicly observable, which means that these excess returns522 The Journal of Finance
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are not achievable. Instead, these return differences should be viewed as indi-
cations of the returns to private information possessed by shorts in aggregate.
They are indications because we do not observe the entire trading history of
short sellers. We would be able to calculate exact excess returns to a class of
short sellers only if we knew all of the shorts and all of the covering trades. As
it stands, the returns reported here are the gross returns available to a hypo-
thetical bystander who observes system shorting flow in all stocks and trades
in a particular way thereafter.
As discussed earlier, some market participants may be able to see pieces of
this flow. The NYSE specialist can observe the short sales in the system order
flow, though only in the small number of stocks that he trades. The specialist
may have some ability to shade his trading accordingly, but the market-making
requirements for specialists probably limit the ability to profit from this infor-
mation. Brokerage firms obviously observe the part of the shorting flow that
theyhandle,andtheycouldusethatinformationtocopytheircustomers’shorts
if they believe that their customers are informed. But the complete flow data
for this sample period are observable only to the econometrician, and only after
the fact.
We also want to reiterate that all of the returns reported here are gross re-
turns, because frictions are completely ignored. Even if a market participant
could observe the short sale flow information, she might not be able to locate
shares to borrow for shorting, and even if she could locate shares, borrowing
those shares might be expensive for some stocks. Both of these frictions would
reduce her returns. We do not have data on the cost of borrowing individual
stocks, because major share lenders, such as brokerage firms and custodians,
consider these data highly proprietary. However, aggregated across a broad
portfolio of stocks, other researchers with access to these data find that insti-
tutions do not generally face a large pecuniary cost for borrowing shares. Only
a small number of individual stocks carry negative rebate rates, and a broad
portfolio of stocks might cost 1% per year to short, which is far lower than the
magnitudeoftheexcessreturnstoprivateinformationreportedhere.Ofcourse,
lendingfeeswouldbeincreasingintheamountborrowed,sotherecouldbescale
limits for an institutional trader making use of these shorting flow data. Indi-
viduals generally find it more expensive to borrow shares. Most brokers pay no
interest to individuals on their short sale proceeds, which means that individu-
als face an opportunity cost on their short sales equal to the short-term riskless
rate.
There are other costs associated with short sales that are harder to measure.
For example, the share lender can terminate the loan at any time, demanding
the return of the shares. If this happens, the share borrower must either find
another share lender or close out the short position by purchasing the required
shares in the open market. This is known as recall risk. It is a particular con-
cern of those who short inactively traded, closely held, or otherwise difficult to
borrow stocks, because a recall may force the short seller to close the position
at an unfavorable price. Such recalls seem to be fairly rare for NYSE stocks,
but we are unaware of any data quantifying the effect, if any, on short sellers.524 The Journal of Finance
Additionalcostsareassociatedwiththecollateralrequiredtoinitiateandmain-
tain a short position. In the United States, Federal Reserve margin require-
ments require a short seller to deposit with its broker the proceeds of the short
sale plus collateral equal to 50% of the value of the shares sold short. The short
seller continues to earn interest or dividends on the posted collateral, so the
main cost is that this collateral cannot be pledged to any other use while the
short position is open.
So far, we have also ignored run-of-the-mill trading costs. The implicit trad-
ing strategies considered here have a holding period of 20 trading days, so it
is possible for the whole portfolio to turn over every month. It turns out that
there is considerable persistence in shorting activity, and the persistence is
virtually identical whether we consider all shorting activity as a fraction of
trading volume or just nonprogram institutional shorting. In either case, when
the portfolio is rebalanced at the end of 20 days, on average 35% of the stocks
remain in the same extreme portfolio, and the other 65% must be liquidated.
Using NYSE TAQ data, we calculate the average effective spread for each stock
each day and assume that a trader must pay the effective half-spread in order
to accumulate or liquidate a position. The returns net of transaction costs are
naturally a bit lower, but are still far from zero. For nonprogram institutional
shorting, heavily shorted stocks underperform lightly shorted stocks by 1.13%
per month net of trading costs, compared to 1.43% per month on a gross basis.
That is, trading costs subtract a total of about 30 basis points per month. These
trading costs may seem quite small, but trading costs have fallen substantially
in recent years with the advent of decimals and increased competition between
liquidity providers. In reality, these trading costs may actually be slightly over-
stated on the short side. The uptick rule implicitly forces short sellers to be less
aggressive in demanding liquidity, which reduces realized trading costs. How-
ever, the uptick rule may increase opportunity costs for short positions that end
up not being taken or initiated with delay. Overall, share borrowing costs and
trading costs appear to be far too small to account for the excess returns we
measure.
VI. Conclusion
In this paper, we use proprietary system order data from the New York Stock
Exchange to examine the incidence and information content of all short sales
and various subsets. There are two striking results. First, short selling is quite
common. Shorting accounts for at least 12.9% of trading volume on average
during our 2000–2004 sample period, and we conclude from this surprising
prevalence that unless the marginal investor is very different from the average
investor, shorting constraints are easily surmounted for even the smallest-cap
NYSE stocks.
The second and main result is that these short sellers are extremely well
informed. We quantify this information content in a number of different ways.
Perhaps the simplest is a portfolio sorted into quintiles based on 1 week’s short-
ing activity. Over the next 20 trading days, a value-weighted portfolio of heav-Which Shorts Are Informed? 525
ily shorted stocks underperforms lightly shorted stocks by a cumulative 1.16%
on average on a risk-adjusted basis (15.6% annualized). Of the six account
typespresentinthedata—individual,institutional(programandnonprogram),
member-firm proprietary (program and nonprogram), and other—nonprogram
institutional shorts are the most informed. Compared to stocks that are lightly
shorted by institutions, the quintile of stocks most heavily shorted by institu-
tions in a given week underperforms by 1.43% over the next 20 trading days
(more than 19.6% on an annualized basis). These alphas do not account for the
cost of shorting, and they cannot be achieved by outsiders, because the inter-
nal NYSE data that we use are not generally available to market participants.
However,thesegrossexcessreturnstoshortingindicatethatinstitutionalshort
sellers have identified and acted on important value-relevant information that
has not yet been impounded into prices. The price effects are permanent, which
suggests that short sellers are not manipulating or otherwise temporarily de-
pressing the share price. The results are strongly consistent with the emerging
consensus in financial economics that short sellers possess important informa-
tion, and that their trades are important contributors to more efficient stock
prices.
In future work, we are interested in understanding more about the source of
the underperformance in heavily shorted stocks. There is some evidence that
short sellers possess information about fundamentals. For example, Christophe
et al. (2004) find that negative earnings surprises are preceded by abnormal
shortselling.Francis,Venkatachalam,andZhang(2005)showthatshortsellers
are able to predict downward analyst forecast revisions, while Desai, Krishna-
murthy, and Venkataraman (2006) find that short sellers are able to anticipate
earnings restatements. However, Daske et al. (2005) do not find that short sell-
ers anticipate negative earnings shocks. We think this is a promising area of
research, and our high frequency data are ideal for investigating short selling
immediately surrounding these kinds of corporate events.
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